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Abstract  This paper empirically examines the effects of a host government’s local ownership restrictions, the choice of 
entry mode and Japanese subsidiaries performance in two selected developing countries namely Malaysia and Thailand that 
received among the highest Japanese FDI fo r fiscal years 2003 through 2009. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the 
influence of host government restriction by using subsidiary’s financial data as the performance ind icator from ORBIS 
database. Our sample consists of 1267 cases. The results reveal that local host government restriction significantly influence 
the choice of entry mode and subsidiaries performance in the two developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) enable Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) get access to larger markets, reducing 
production cost with cheap labor and other advantages that 
can provide them with higher profitability and business 
growth. On the other hands, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
also provide advantages to the host country on the economy 
and technology through technology transfer, diffusion of 
management skills and the explo itation of the international 
market.  
Entry mode is one of the important parts in order to go 
abroad through FDI. There were two familiar type of entry 
mode known as joint ventures (JVs) and wholly owned 
subsidiaries (WOS) depend on host countries’ restrictive. 
Local government restrictions on entry mode were different 
between countries. Research by[1] on local ownership 
restriction in  Japanese subsidiaries in  Asia found that the 
extent of local ownership restrictions is negatively and 
significantly associated with the financial perfo rmance of 
WOS and does not directly influence the JVs entry mode.  
There is still insufficient research on the impact of host 
governments’ restrict ion  on the perfo rmance of fo reign 
subsidiaries. It is very important for MNCs to understand  
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how the host country restrictions affect their subsidiary 
performance. Clear understanding on the effect of local 
government restriction may assist the MNCs to  make 
decision on selecting the best host country for their 
subsidiaries. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to 
examine the relationship between the local ownership 
restrictions towards choice of entry mode and subsidiary 
performance in two selected developing countries.  
2. Literature Review 
In past literature, researchers have mention that host 
government’s local ownership restriction have influence the 
choice of entry mode[1],[2],[3]. For developing countries, 
Reference[2] in his research on ownership patterns of U.S 
joint venture abroad found that government mandates and 
political risk perception are crucial than market size. 
Beamish[4] also state that the developing nation’s more than 
half percentage cites government restrict ions as important 
factor and only one third indicate the need for local skills 
workers. Whilst for developed countries, most of the MNCs 
select the joint venture as entry mode as the need for local 
partner skills. Only small percentage said that government 
restrictions were the factor that influences the ownership 
structures for subsidiaries. 
Other research by[3] mentions about two type of 
ownership structure. Firstly was the structure that can 
minimize the transaction costs of doing business abroad and 
secondly, the ownership structure are determined by 
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negotiations with host governments, where the outcomes 
depend on the bargaining power of the firm. In his research 
results, his found that attractive domestic markets increase 
the power of host governments. 
Reference[1] had mention about three argument regarding 
local ownership restrict ions and subsidiary performance. The 
first argument postulates that local ownership restriction has 
negative impact on subsidiary performance. Thus, this 
perspective suggests that a host government’s local 
ownership policy leads to lower performance. The second 
argument suggests that host government facilitates a foreign 
firm’s resource access opportunities by providing a wide 
range of subsidies and fiscal incentives and protection from 
competitor with in and outside the host country. The last 
argument suggests that local ownership restriction itself does 
not affect JVs  performance. The assumption is that since 
most foreign firms have many options of overseas 
investment opportunities, a decision to invest takes a very 
careful consideration of the costs and benefits of a particular 
investment project.  
Moreover, they also found that local ownership 
restrictions was differ among countries where Thailand use 
the general ownership criterion, while Malaysia use 
combination of general ownership criterion and industry-or 
project-based restrictions. In short, local ownership 
restriction can either h inder, facilitate, o r do nothing for 
subsidiary operations in host country can be negative, 
positive or neutral factor that influence on subsidiary 
performance. Seems that Thailand implemented the general 
ownership restriction,[5] found that there is significant 
difference between Japanese subsidiaries ownership and it 
performance at the local host country  
On the other hand, parent financial performance also may 
influence the performance of their subsidiaries in local host 
country. The six primary measures of operating performance 
are the rate of return on shareholder fund (RSHF) or known 
normally as return on equity (ROE), return on capital 
employed (ROC), return on assets (ROA), p rofit  marg in 
(PRMA), R&D per operating value (RDOP) and solvency 
ratio (SOLR). These profitability rat ios were used to assess 
the business ability to generate earnings and at the same time 
investigate the financial health of companies during a 
specific period of time. 
Despite local ownership restrict ion and parent financial 
performance, parent characteristic such as international 
experience and number of local workers also contribute to 
the success of the subsidiaries.  
Based on all previous arguments, we propose the 
following three specific hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a  significant difference in  
performance between local ownership restriction and choice 
of entry mode. 
Hypothesis 1b: In the case of developing countries, JVs 
entry mode performs better than wholly owned subsidiary 
Hypothesis 2: Parent financial ratios has significant 
impact on subsidiary performance in developing countries 
Hypothesis 3: Parent characteristics are negatively 
correlated to subsidiary’s performance in developing 
countries. 
3. Methodology 
This study examines the relationship between entry modes, 
domestic variables, and parent characteristics of Japanese 
companies, and the attained performance of their 
subsidiaries. The p rincipal focus of this study is the operating 
performance of Japanese companies. We applied multip le 
regression models in this research and the suggested focus 
was on the performance of the selected MNC subsidiaries. 
The classification of entry modes was based on the 
percentage of share ownership of the major shareholders as 
reported in this database. Firms with over 95% ownership 
were considered as wholly owned subsidiaries and those 
below than 95% ownership were considered as majority 
owned subsidiaries. Therefore, 95% ownership has been 
used in this research as well to distinguish between wholly 
owned firms and partnerships. 
The data for the entry mode and the perfo rmance of the 
subsidiaries was derived from the ORBIS database for fiscal 
years 2003 through 2009. The criteria for inclusion of firms 
in the sample were as follows: 
1. We selected only firms that show all the financial data 
that we use in this research. The companies that have 80% of 
missing data were eliminated from the sample. 
2. We only selected the industry type of business and 
excluded all the others types of business such as banking and 
insurance firms.  
Our final samples include 609 cases for Malaysia and 
1085 cases for Thailand. It  appears that the financial 
statement ratios of Japanese subsidiaries in Malaysia and 
Thailand come from a single database, thus we were ab le to 
directly compare these two countries because they use the 
same accounting principles.  
3.1. Dependent and Independent Variables 
Various variables have been used in previous studies 
dealing with a firm’s performance. According to[6] in their 
research on determinants of financial performance, they 
found that financial performance variab les include widely 
used measures embracing levels, growth and variability in 
profit (typically related to assets, investments or owner’s 
equity) as well as such measures as market value, assets, 
equity, cash flow, research & development (R&D), sales 
and market/book value. Some variab les serve as 
performance characteristics; for example, some studies use 
sales growth as a performance measure. In addition, all 
financial return variables were measured in percentage or 
fraction form such as concentration ratios, market share (%), 
growth rate (%), advertising/sales ratios, R&D/sales ratios, 
and ratios of capital investment to a size measure. 
Reference[7] in their research about strategic performance 
measurement approaches to explain a firm’s performance 
14 Norhidayah Mohamad et al.:  Host Country Restrictions, Choice of Entry Mode and Japanese  
Subsidiaries Performance in Developing Countries  
 
found that strategic performance measurement practices are 
associated with accounting measures such as sales growth.  
However, in this research, the financial rat ios were used 
to measure the performance of Japanese MNC subsidiaries 
in Malaysia and Thailand. The measurements consisted of 
three profitability ratios (ROE, ROA, and PRMA) and one 
structure ratio  (SOLR). For the analysis, a  simultaneous 
analysis of several groups was used using SPSS 18.0 for 
Windows software.   
This research consists of nine independent variables, 
which come from the data of parent companies. The parent 
company’s data takes into account the parent company’s 
ROE, ROC, ROA, PRMA, RDOP, SOLR, age and number 
of workers.  
4. Empirical Result 
4.1. A Descriptive Comparison of the Samples 
Table 1.  Mean financial statement ratios for Japanese MNCs subsidiaries 
in Malaysia and Thailand for Fiscal Year 2003 until 2009 
 Parent Subsidiaries 
Return on Assets (ROA) 2.11 6.80 
Profit  Margin (PRMA) 5.07 6.52 
Return on Capital Employed (ROC) 7.22 19.87 
Solvency Ratio (SOLR) 38.87 51.68 
Return on Shareholder Fund (ROE) 10.0 19.0 
Age 66 20 
No. of Employees 79651 1089 
   
Ownership Wholly owned 
Majority 
owned 
Subsidiaries in Malaysia & Thailand 315 1379 
Table 1 show the descriptive analysis for these two 
selected developing countries. Most Japanese subsidiaries 
age in these two countries is around 20 years old while the 
age of parent companies were three t ime older than the 
subsidiaries companies. In  the case of developing countries, 
a wholly owned entry mode indicate small number with only 
315 cases compare to JVs entry mode with 1379 cases of 
majority owned subsidiaries. The statistic shows that JVs is 
more p referab le than wholly owned ownership in these two 
countries.  
Moreover, the financial rat io ind icate that Japanese 
subsidiaries at the host country have a better performance 
with highest ratio in ROA, ROC, SOLR and ROE compare 
with the parent financial ratios. 
4.2. Testing for Differences between Local Government 
Restriction, Entry Mode and a Firm’s Performance 
In this research, the classification of performance was 
measured by using subsidiary financial data comprised of 
profitability ratios and structure ratios. Whilst local 
ownership restrictions were grouped into two categories 
based on the past research finding by[1]. They found that 
Thailand use general ownership criterion (General) and 
Malaysia use industry and project-based restriction 
(Combination). Therefore, we used these two types of local 
ownership restriction and group it into “General” and 
“Combination”.  
Non-parametric tests were employed to determine if a  
statistically significant difference existed between ownership 
and performance in these two countries. The Mann-Whitney 
test is used to see whether variances exist in different groups. 
Therefore, if the Mann-Whitney test is significant at p ≤ 0.05, 
confidence can be gained in the hypothesis that the variances 
are significantly different and that the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances has been violated. In the case of 
developing countries, there were d ifferences between local 
ownership restriction with entry mode and firm’s 
performance as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2.  Mann-Whitney test 
 
Local 
Ownership 
Restriction 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 
Ownership  
General 1085 860.17 933289 
0.017 Combination 606 820.62 497297 
Total 1691   
Subsidiary Solvency Ratio % 
  
General 1070 752.23 804884 
0.034 Combination 465 804.29 373996 
Total 1535   
Subsidiary Profit Margin %  
General 1049 824.81 865227 
0.000 Combination 465 605.65 281627 
Total 1514   
Subsidiary ROA  
General 1080 812.92 877949 
0.000 Combination 466 682.15 317882 
Total 1546   
Subsidiary Return on Shareholder 
Funds %  
General 1044 812.92 835802 
0.000 Combination 457 682.15 2914480 
Total 1501   
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The analysis shows that the ownership restriction has 
significantly influence the choice of entry mode and 
subsidiaries financial performance in the local host country 
with p -value less than 0.05. Thus we support hypothesis 1a in 
this research. To look into more details regard ing the 
relationship between parent’s and subsidiaries financial 
performance, we analyse the data using multip le regression 
as the result as show in Tab le 3. For the regression analysis, 
we used the subsidiary’s solvency ratio as the indicator for 
business performance in the host countries.  
4.3. Multiple Regressions 
Multiple linear regression models with one dependent Y 
variable:  
Y = i +Xb + e                 (1) 
Where Y = a vector containing observed scores on the 
dependent variable; 
i = a vector 1 
X = a matrix of continuously distributed or categorical 
(dummy-coded) independent variables 
b = the vector of regression weights 
e = the vector of residual or error or leftover scoring 
unexplained by the model 
A multip le regression applied for the independent 
variables in order to determine the significance of their effect 
on a subsidiary’s performance and to test if the sign of their 
correlation followed the outcome of the hypothesis. The 
hypothesised signs and the results of the multip le regressions 
are shown in Table 3. This table consist of three regression 
models for subsidiary performance measure by solvency 
ratio. The upper numbers in the rows show the b-value that 
states the relationship between the dependent variable and 
each of the predictor. The positive value means the positive 
relationship between the predictor and outcome, whereas a 
negative coefficient represents a negative relat ionship. 
According to[8], a positive sign for a regression coefficient 
indicates that the variable increases the likelihood of higher 
performance, while a negative sign indicates an increase in 
the likelihood of lower performance.  
In this regression model, six predictors are making 
significant contributions to the model, which are parent ROE, 
parent’s RDOP, parent’s SOLR, parent’s Age, parent’s 
workers and ownership with  varying values. The parent ROE, 
parent SOLR and parent’s worker have the positive 
significance value indicates that all these predictors may 
contribute to increase the subsidiary performance. The 
increasing in parent’s number o f workers does enhance the 
subsidiary performance in the host countries. The results 
show that additional number of workers also may  increase 
their firm performance in these developing countries. 
Moreover, the analysis indicates that choice of entry mode 
also contribute to subsidiary performance. The positive 
significant value means JVs with majority ownership may 
contribute to better subsidiary’s solvency ratio performance. 
Thus this findings support the hypothesis 1b in this research. 
However, our findings show that not all the profitability 
predictors from the parent companies will enhance the 
performance of their subsidiaries in the host country. Based 
on Table 3, five out of eleven pred ictors have negative 
b-value indicating negative relationship with subsidiary 
solvency ratio (SOLR) perfo rmance. The parent company’s 
ROC, ROA and SOLR indicate a negative value and a 
significant result with p value less than .05 in the case of 
Malaysia and Thailand. The negative value in this finding 
indicates that an increase in the parent company’s ROC, 
ROA rat io and SOLR ratio  by one standard deviation may 
reduce the subsidiary’s performance at the host country.  
Table 3.  Regression Coefficients with b-value in italic and standard errors 
in brackets 
Dependent Variables Subsidiary Solvency Ratio 
Independent Variables Model 1 2 3 
Constant 31.10*** 18.26*** 14.40*** 
 (2.26) (5.96) (6.14) Parent Return on 
Shareholder Fund 
0.25*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Parent Return on 
Capital Employed 
-0.42 -0.26 -0.29 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Parent Return on Assets -0.72 -0.86 -0.87 (0.55) (0.54) (0.54) 
Parent Profit  Margin 
 
0.23 0.10 0.18 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Parent R&D per 
Operating Value 
-0.08 -0.65** -0.68** 
(0.27) (0.32) (0.33) 
Parent Solvency Ratio 
 
0.56*** 0.63*** 0.64*** 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Parent Age  -0.11*** -0.10*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Parent No. of Workers  4.59*** 4.55*** 
  (1.16) (1.17) 
Ownership   4.15** 
  (1.74) Local Ownership 
Restriction   
-1.19 
  (1.52) 
R-squared .124 .146 .150 
F-Statistics 29.17 26.82 22.17 
Sig .000 .000 .000 
No. of Observation 1267 
Moreover, our results also show that the parent 
characteristics, measured by the parent’s age indicate 
negative significant value for both countries based on 
subsidiary’s solvency ratio performance. The negative 
values indicate that as the parent age increases, it may reduce 
the performance of their subsidiary in the host country. 
These results show that company profitability  changes 
systematically with firm’s age where in early stage, firms 
realise a substantial increase in profitability, while mature 
firms face a slow decline in profitability[9].  
This due to the investment in product development that 
generates profitability increase for young firms while 
competitiveness pressure from new entrants lead to decline 
in profitability for mature firms. It also supports the 
empirical findings on industry lifecycle, theoretical model of 
industry lifecycle and dynamics, and empirical patterns of 
firm and industry dynamics collectively  suggest that the 
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shape of the size distribution should change as an industry 
ages[10]. 
Thus, we partially support the second and third hypothesis 
in this research study. 
5. Conclusions  
The choice of entry mode and subsidiaries performance 
has long been a concern of international business scholar. 
Local ownership restriction in Malaysia and Thailand was 
vary where Thailand use the general ownership criterion, 
while Malaysia use combination of general ownership 
criterion and industry-or project-based restrictions. Analysis 
from ORBIS database reveals that local ownership 
restriction has significant influence towards choice of entry 
mode and subsidiary financial performance in  both 
developing countries.  
The relationship between ownership and a firm’s 
performance is an important issue. In the current study, we 
found that JVs with majority ownership subsidiaries has a 
better performance than the wholly owned entry mode. The 
significant ownership results for Japanese subsidiaries in 
Malaysia and Thailand show that, the form of business will 
reflect the subsidiary SOLR performance. The significant 
result for both countries also consistent with[11],[12],[13] 
that found a significant relationship between ownership and 
firm’s performance. Therefore, we support the hypothesis 1a 
and 1b where ownership had significant d ifference in 
performance and joint venture entry mode performs better 
than wholly owned subsidiaries in Malaysia and Thailand.  
Moreover, the results also reveal that Japanese parent 
company’s financial performances are significantly 
influenced the subsidiaries financial performance in 
Malaysia and Thailand. As mentioned by[14], the 
contribution of the parent company’s resources, informat ion, 
adaptation, and flexibility enable the subsidiary to gain more 
from the parent company and at the same time increase their 
performance. Moreover, based on the OLI theory, possession 
of superior intangible and  tangible assets from parents to 
subsidiaries in  developing product differentiat ion to satisfy 
local market need with R&D activ ities is a part of the 
ownership advantages that may  enhance the performance of 
the subsidiary in the host country. 
In addition, in this paper we have also considered the 
effect of parent characteristics on the performance of their 
subsidiaries. For Malaysia and Thailand, parent age indicates 
a negative significant relat ionship with a subsidiary’s 
solvency ratio performance. As the descriptive analysis 
shows that the age of parent companies was more than half 
century. At the age, probably the parent companies already 
passed the mature stage where firms face a slow decline in 
profitability[9]. This is because competitiveness pressure 
from new entrants leads to profitability decline fo r mature 
firms. It also supports the empirical findings on industry 
lifecycle, the theoretical model of industry lifecycle and 
dynamics, and empirical patterns of firm and industry 
dynamics collectively  suggest that the shape of the size 
distribution should change as an industry ages[10]. Thus, we 
partially accept the third hypothesis.  
This study contributes significantly to the development of 
a general FDI theory by using new financial variab les for 
performance measurement in  the case of Japanese 
subsidiaries in two ASEAN countries from the year 2003 
until 2009. However, this study was limited by data 
reliability and the lack of availab le data. Even though we 
tried to consider many variables from the data of parent 
companies in measuring the performance of subsidiaries, 
this does not mean that we were able to capture all the data 
variables. This implies that it is still necessary to use other 
variables such as investment objectives, and other 
profitability ratios of parent companies that may affect the 
success of subsidiaries in foreign countries. Furthermore, 
only Japanese companies took part in this research. Thus, 
with the data available to us, our general findings were 
confined to Japanese firms only. Future research should 
look into this aspect.  
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